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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER THE
ALIEN LAND LAWS
Recent developments, both in the United States and abroad, have
resulted in an increased awareness of human rights and the necessity
for their legal protection. The manisfestations of this trend have appeared on the national as well as the international level, taking the form
of treaties and covenants or legislative and judicial action. The purpose
of this article is to highlight a facet of this development by examining
the constitutional problems which have recently arisen in connection
with the Alien Land Laws of some of the United States.
I. THE ALIEN LAND LAWS AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The issue of the constitutionality of the Alien Land Laws has not
been met squarely by the highest court in the land since 1923. In that
year the right of a state to deny residents, ineligible to citizenship by
reason of federal law, the privilege of owning land was upheld.1
Nevertheless, the late decisions of both federal and state courts indicate
that when the problem is squarely considered by the Supreme Court the
2
1923 decisions will be reversed.
Due Process
It is well established that aliens are entitled to the same protection
of the Fourteenth Amendment as citizens.
"Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."
It is not confined to the protection of citizens. The Amendment is
universal in its application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of
nationality. 3 The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
operative to protect the individual, whether he be alien or citizen, against
state interference with private rights.
The leading case relied upon by those who would speak for the
continued validity of the Alien Land Laws is Terrace v. Thompson. In
that case Justice Butler concluded that legislation denying aliens the
right to own real property did not violate the due process guaranty. He
based that conclusion on two grounds: (1) The Fourteenth Amendment did not take away from the states those police powers that were
reserved at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; and (2) one
I Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225; Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313; Frick v.
Webb, 263 U.S. 326; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197.
2 Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm., 334 P.S. 410 (1948); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) ; Kenji Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579, 204 P. 2d
569 (1949); Sei Fujii v. California, 39 Cal. 2nd 218, 242 P. 2d 617 (1952);
Haruye Masaoka v. People, 245 P. 2d 1062 (Cal. 1952).
3 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1885).
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of those powers, in the absence of any treaty provision to the contrary,
was to deny aliens the right to own land.
Refusal to accept the decision of the Terrace case and to apply it in
present day considerations of the subject of alien land ownership lies
in a reinterpretation of the concept of state police power.
Police power may be defined as the power inherent in a government
to enact laws, within constitutional limits to promote the order, safety,
4
health, morals, and general welfare of society.
A state must exercise its police power subject to constitutional
limitations and a state statute enacted in pursuance of the police power
is void if in contravention of any express provision of the Federal
Constitution. 5 It is thus clearly indicated that the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment constitutes a limitation on the police powers
of the states. The purpose of the guarantee is to prevent governmental
encroachment upon the life, liberty and property of individuals, to
secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government and to protect property from seizure by legislative enactments, and conviction without the ordinary modes of judicial
procedure. 6
In determining the validity of a statute which calls upon state police
power for its enforcement, the courts are determined to protect constitutional rights; and a police regulation found to be without real and
substantial relation to the objects properly within the police power, i.e.,
public health, safety, morals or general welfare, is a palpable invasion
of due process of law and will be adjudged invalid.7
Admittedly, the manner in which the police power may be exercised
is within the discretion of the state. This right is subject only to the
condition that no laws prescribed by a state shall contravene the Constitution of the United States which forbids state legislation by which the
property of any person is wrested from him without adequate compensation.
Therefore, in examining the Alien Land Laws, we must ask what
is the relation between alien land ownership and health, morals, safety
or welfare, which are the proper subjects of state police action? What
legitimate justifications are there for restrictions upon alien land ownership? Is there anything inherently injurious to morals or dangerous to
the public health, safety or welfare in the mere fact of such land
ownership or control?
"Congress has neither declared nor assumed that landowners
ineligible to citizenship are a danger to the state.""
416 C. J. S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §174 and cases there cited.
and cases there cited.
6Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377 (1893).
5 16 C. J. S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §196

7
8

Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111-112 (1928).
Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2nd 718, 242 P. 2d 617, 626 (1952).
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If the legislation upon the subject of alien land ownership is to be
sustained, there must be found within ineligible aliens some valid reason
why they should not be permitted to own and rent real property. In
fact, in order to sustain the validity of the law, it is necessary to find
within ineligible aliens an unfavorable quality of such magnitude that it
demands that they be kept from owning land especially in light of the
14th Amendment which protects the individual against state interference
with private rights that cannot be more than offset by public benefitY
It cannot logically be assumed that ineligible aliens are incompetent
farmers and that they should be barred from the soil as a means of
conserving it. It cannot be soundly argued that they are wasteful of
10
our natural resources.
Justice Murphy in Oyama v. California,held:
"As this court has said, 'Loyalty is a matter of the heart and
mind, not of race, creed or color. Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283,
302.' And so, racial eligibility for citizenship is an irrational basis
for determining who is loyal or who desires to work for the
welfare of the state.""
But on the other hand the interference with private rights that flow
from such a law is not difficult to perceive. In Terrace v. Thompson, a
Japanese, who was admittedly an expert farmer was prohibited from
advancing beyond the status of an ordinary laborer in one of the
country's major occupationg. He could not utilize his skill or his savings
to better himself economically in what was the one field of endeavor he
had mastered.
Equal Protection
The Supreme Court has long established that unreasonable discrimination against any person regardless of race, color or nationality
is unconstitutional as violating the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Amendment guarantees to any person
within the jurisdiction of a state the equal protection of the laws.' 2
Thus, every state law that discriminates against a particular class of
residents must run the gauntlet of the Fourteenth Amendment's limitation: "No state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
3
equal protection of the laws."'
What is the "equal protection" that states are forbidden to deny
residents, aliens and all others? The Supreme Court's interpretation,
which has been settled for at least fifty years,' 4 is that no state shall
9 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).

'0 Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2nd 718, 242 P. 2d 617 (1952).
11 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 666 (1948).
12 Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
"Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
24

Gulf Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897).
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make any discrimination against alien residents that is not rational with
respect to the purpose of the particular statute by which it is made.
Not all state discrimination against alien residents that is not rational
with respect to the purpose of the particular statute by which it is
made. Not all state discrimination laws are unconstitutional, for a class
of persons may be singled out for different treatment provided the
characteristics which distinguish the class rationally justify the difference in treatment; it only requires that all classifications be based upon
substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the object or
persons dealt with and to the public purpose sought to be achieved. 15
To put it another way, in order for class legislation to become the
law of the state in harmony with the Fourteenth Amendment, the
statute must possess each of two indispensible qualities: (1) It must
be so framed as to extend to and embrace equally all persons who are
or may be in the like situation and circumstances, and (2) the classification must be natural and reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious.16
By its terms the land law classified persons on the basis of eligibility
to citizenship, but in fact it classifies on the basis of race or nationality.
This is a necessary consequence of the use of the express racial qualifications found in the Federal Code.' 7 Although the Japanese are not
singled out by name for discriminatory treatment in the land law, the
reference therein to federal standards for naturalization which exclude
Japanese operates automatically to bring about the result. This was
recognized in Oyama v. California,where Chief Justice Vinson, speaking for a majority of the Court, concluded that the alien land law as
applied in that case discriminated against a Japanese-American citizen,
and that the "only basis for this discrimination was the fact that his
father was Japanese and not American, Russian, Chinese or English.""'
Subsequent to the Oyama case the Supreme Court condemned the
enforcement by state courts of covenants which restrict occupany of
real property on the basis of race or color, and it expressly pointed out
that statutes incorporating such restrictions would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 9
The fallacy in the contention that the Alien Land Laws merely carry
a congressional policy into effect appears from a cursory examination
of the two totally distinct types of legislation. Congress has enacted a
naturalization law, not a property law. Congress regulates admission to
citizenship, not ownership of property. In addition, as pointed out by
Chief Justice Gibson of the California Supreme Court in Sei Fujii v.
'5

Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 4000 (1910).

16 C. J. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §961 and cases there cited.
17 Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2nd 718, 242 P. 2d 617 (1952).

is Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644 (1948).
19 Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 11 (1948).
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California, in passing the immigration laws, Congress was exercising
its plenary power over immigration and naturalization, and was not
20
inhibited by the watchful eye of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Therefore, if a state wishes to borrow a federal system of grouping,
it must justify the adopted classification in its new setting, and the
state's use of the distinction must stand or fall on its own merits.
In determining whether the Alien Land Law meets these constitutional requisites we must look to the decisions of our courts.
In the case of Qyama v. California, California brought suit to
escheat a section of land taken in the name of D who, at the time of the
conveyance to him, was a minor. D's father, an "alien ineligible for
American citizenship," was furnished the consideration for the conveyance. Action was commenced under California General Laws Act
261, comonly known as the Alien Land Law. It provides inter alia for
the escheat of any land transferred with "intent to prevent or avoid"
escheat as theretofore provided for, and that there is a prima facia
presumption of intent to avoid or prevent escheat whenever a transfer
is made for consideration furnished by an "alien ineligible for American
citizenship." The California Supreme Court upheld the statute and the
escheat of D's land under it. The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision holding that the California statute denied to D the
equa, protection of the laws and was therefore unconstitutional under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Chief Justice Vinson who delivered the opinion for the Court, felt
that the burden placed on D of proving a bona fide gift was a denial of
equal protection since under similar circumstances where the person
furnishing the consideration is not an ineligible alien, a gift is presumed
because of the family relation. Quoting the Chief Justice:
"There remains the question of whether discrimination between
citizens on the basis of their racial descent is justifiable. Here
we start with the proposition that only the most exceptional circumstances can excuse discrimination on that basis in the face of
the equal protection clause and a federal statute giving all citizens
the right to own land. .

.

.Assuming, for the purposes of this

argument only, that the basic prohibition (Alien Land Law) is
constitutional, it does not follow that there is no constitutional
''
limit to the means which may be used to enforce it. 21
justice Black, with whom
opinion, stated that he would
ground that the Alien Land
primarily because it infringes
immigration.
20

21

Justice Douglas agreed, in a concurring
have placed the decision on the broader
Law is unconstitutional in its entirety,
on the exclusive power of Congress over

Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2nd 718, P. 2d 617 (1952).
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948).
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"If there is any one purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment that
is wholly outside the realm of doubt, it is that the Amendment
was designed to bar States from denying to some groups, on
account of their race or color, any rights, privileges, and opportunities accorded to other groups. I would now overrule the
previous decisions of this court that sustained state land laws
which discriminate against people of Japanese origin residing in
this country. "22
About six months after the Oyama decision was announced,
Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm., was decided. It held that a
California statute that forbade the issuance of commercial fishing
licenses to ineligible aliens was repugnant to the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment as being an unreasonable and arbitrary
classification on the basis of nationality. Mr. Justice Black said:
"That the United States regulates immigration and naturalization
in part on the basis of race and color classifications, does not
authorize adoption by a state of such classifications to prevent
earning a livelilawfully admitted aliens within its borders from
23

hood by means open to all other inhabitants.1

In Sei Fujii v. California, the constitutionality of the Alien Land
Law was overturned. The court conceded that classification is proper
provided the one class on which the burden will fall manifests to a real
extent characteristics different from all other persons. But color, race
and creed was not a proper differentiating characteristic on which a
classification could be based. The court found that the law was a vicious
denial of the equal protection of the law and consequently unconstitu2 4

tional.

Following three months after the Fujii case was Haruye Masaoka
et al v. People which stands as the latest word to date on the issue of
alien land ownership. In that case five American brothers agreed to
build a home for their widowed mother, a Japanese alien ineligible to
citizenship. The mother and her sons brought an action against the
People of the State of California to determine whether the residential
property had escheated to the State by operation of the Alien Land Law.
The court's decision in the Fujii case was controlling and the Alien
Land Law was held unconstitutional because in violation of the Four25
teenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
We observe that the California Attorney General, Fred Hauser, in
referring to the Oyama decision and the present trend of judicial reasoning on the subject and in indicating his intention to dismiss all the
escheat cases pending before the California courts, thought that if the
22Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649 (1948).

23 Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm., 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
24 Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2nd 718, 242 P. 2d 617 (1952).
25Haruye Masaoka v. People, 249 P. 2d 1062 (Cal. 1952).
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validity of the law came before the United States Supreme Court the
26
Justices "no doubt would invalidate the law as unconstitutional."
From the standpoint of the Fourteenth Amendment therefore, it
seems clear that the decision of Terrace v. Thompson has been weakened
by subsequent decisions which appear to invite, rather than foreclose,
further consideration of the constitutional issues raised by the Alien
Land Law. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the rights to acquire,
enjoy, own and dispose of property are among the civil rights intended
to be protected from discriminatory state action and the power of a
state to regulate the use and ownership of land, must be exercised subject to the controls and limitations of that amendment. Even if the
declared purpose of the Alien Land Law, classifying persons on the
basis of eligibility to citizenship is to restrict use and ownership of land
to persons who are loyal and who have an interest in the welfare of the
state, the classification is still unreasonable, since eligibility or ineligibility to citizenship does not, per se, establish loyalty or lack of
loyalty, or absence of interest in the welfare of the state.

II.

THE ALIEN LAND LAwS AND THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

It is today almost universally admitted that the drafters of the
United Nations Charter were concerned with the creation of an organization capable not only of ensuring a lasting peace, but also of obtaining
a more universal recognition of fundamental human rights. As a part
of this effort, they have inserted the following provision:
"Article 55 . . . The United Nations shall promote: . . . c)
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race,
sex, language or religion."
An examination of the language of Article 55 (c) indicates that, in
order to effectively use any of its provisions, some interpretation is
necessary. Some of the legal problems presented by the application of
this provision to the Alien Land Laws are discussed below in the order
in which they arise. The importance of these problems is readily apparent as it is well established that state legislation conflicting with a
27
valid, operative treaty is thereby rendered ineffective.
The Human Rights Provisions and the Federal
Treaty-Making Power
It is clear that no reliance could be placed on the human rights provisions (Article 55 (c)) of the United Nations Charter, unless they
26

San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 28, 1948, p. 2, col. 6, as reported in 36 CALIF. LAW

2 7 Rav.

320, 324.

Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) ; 52 AM. JuR. Tparms §18, and
cases there cited.
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constitute a valid treaty in the constitutional sense." Our first problem,
therefore, involves the determination of whether the provisions in
question are within the treaty-making power of the United States.
It is now well-established that the treaty-making power of the
United States under Art. II, Sec. 2, Cl. 2 of the Constitution 29 is
unlimited except in the following two respects: (1) The subject-matter
of the treaty must be a proper subject of negotiation between our
Government and the governments of other nations, and (2) the provisions of the treaty must not contravene express constitutional provisions, nor materially alter the form of our Federal Government or
that of a particular state. 0
That the regulation of the rights of aliens is a proper subject of
negotiation between our government and the governments of other
nations is clearly shown by the following holding of our Supreme Court:
"It is ... clear that the protection which should be afforded to
the citizens of one country owning property in another, and the
manner in which that property may be transferred, devised or
inherited, are fitting subjects for such negotiation and of regulation by mutual stipulation between the two countries. .."31
An examination of the human rights provisions of the United
Nations Charter indicates that no conflict exists between such provisions
and any part of the United States Constitution. No change in the form
of the Federal or State Government is contemplated or would necessarily result thereunder.
Nor could an objection to the efficacy of the human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter be successfully made on the
ground that such provisions invade that field which, under the Tenth
Amendment, is reserved to the states. That argument is conclusively
disposed of by Missouri v. Holland,3 2 which held that the Tenth
Amendment to our Constitution had no application to the treaty-making
power of the United States, since that power is expressly granted to the
United States and denied to the states.
It is therefore apparent that the human rights provision of the
28The following constitutional provisions are involved: "He (The President)

shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." ART. II,SEC. 2,
CL. 2. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution of Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." ART. VI,
CL., 2.

29
30

Cited in full in note 1, supra.

Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
31 Ibid.
32 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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United Nations Charter are within the limitations of the treaty-making
power of the United States.
The Requirement of Self-Execution
The proposition that a treaty, in order to be operative without
legislative implementation must be self-executing, is today too plain to
33
be disputed.
The test of when a treaty is self-executing has been the subject of
rrach judicial discussion. An examination of the authorities indicates
that the fundamental test on the question is the intent of the contracting
parties. 34
In attempting to determine the intent of the parties to a particular
treaty the courts indulge in a presumption to the effect that treaties
are formulated upon deliberate reflection, and that their wording and
provisions are carefully chosen. Thus, it will be presumed that no
phrase or provision is inserted without an intended effect. 35
In examining the provisions involved in the light of this presumption
the following conclusions become apparent; the language of Article 55
(c), by reason of the futurity of its tenor, clearly indicates that in and
of itself it could not have been intended to be operative without
legislative implementation. Article 56, however, provides as follows:
"All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate
action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement
of the purposes set forth in Article 55."
Under the presumption discussed above, Article 56 must have some
intended effect. The only such effect it could logically have is to render
the otherwise executory Article 55 self-executing and operative ipso
fure.3" Any other construction of Article 56 would render it superfluous
and meaningless.
It might therefore be concluded that the human rights provisions of
the United Nations Charter are self-executing. There are several indications, however, that an opposite conclusion would be more appropriate.
First, one of the difficulties inherent in the argument above expressed is that on the basis of that argument, all of Article 55 would
have to be construed as self-executing.3 7 Under that construction the
33

Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253 (U.S. 1829).

34Valentine v. U.S., 299 U.S. 5 (1936); 52 AM. Ju. TREATIzs, §26, and cases

there cited.

35 The Nereide, 9 Cranch 388 (U.S. 1815); Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317
(1912).

36 A similar conclusion was reached in Professor Quincy Wright in "National
Courts and Human Rights-The Fuii Case"; 45 Am. J. INT'L L. 62 (1951).
37 U. N. CHARTER ART. 55.... The United Nations shall promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic
and social progress and development;
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member nations and all of their political subdivisions would be immediately obligated to promote far-reaching economic and social
measures, which could hardly have been the intent of the signatories.
Second, the conclusion that the human rights provisions of the
United Nations Charter are self-executing places an extreme strain on
the language of the articles involved. Reading Articles 55 and 56 as a
whole, it is apparent that an in futuro rather than in praesenti result is
meant by their phraseology. This seems particularly clear when a
comparison is made between the language of Article 55 and several
other provisions, 3 where the drafters employed in praesenti language,
and which have been judicially construed as self-executing.3 9
The conclusion that the human rights provisions of the United
Nations Charter are not self-executing therefore seems inescapable in
the light of the above. That does not mean, however, that the Charter
to that extent is without any effect. The human rights provisions at
least morally obligate the United States to implement the purposes
0
expressed in Article 55 by appropriate legislation.4
The Meaning of."Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms"
The next problem in determining the applicability of the human
rights provisions of the United Nations Charter to the Alien Land Laws
is the question of whether the term "human rights and fundamental
freedoms" as used in Article 55 can be construed to include the right
to own property.
The following is the universally accepted test in construing and
interpreting the meaning of particular treaty terms or provisions:
"In the construction of treaties words are presumed to have been
used in the sense of their 'ordinary' or 'normal' meaning unless
strong evidence to the contrary appears."41
In the language of the Supreme Court of the United States:
* . Compacts between governments or nations, like
those
between individuals, should be interpreted according to the
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems;
and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."
31The Following Articles of The U. N. CHARTER clearly appear to be in praesenti:
ART. 104--"The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions
and the fulfillment of its purposes." ART. 105---"The Organization shall enjoy
in the territory of each of its members such privileges and immunities as are
necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes."
39 Curran v. City of New York, 191 Misc. 229, "77 N.Y.S. 2d 206 (1947) ; Balfour,
40

Guthrie & Co. v. United States, 90 Fed. Supp. 831 (D.C. 1950).

Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1946).

415 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,

246, (1943).
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natural, fair and42 received acceptation of the terms in which they
are expressed."
Applying this test, it would seem that the term "human rights and
fundamental freedoms" does include the right to hold property.
Property rights have, from time immemorial, been regarded as among
the most sacred, basic and fundamental rights men can enjoy, by reason
solely of the fact that they are human beings. This is clearly expressed
by our Supreme Court, which held:
"that the right of acquiring and possessing property, and having
it protected, is one of the natural, inherent and unalienable rights
of man. Men have a sense of property: Property is necessary to
their subsistence, and correspondent to their natural wants and
desires; its security was one of the objects, that induced them
to unite in society. No man would become a member of a community in which he could not enjoy the fruits of his honest
labour and industry. The preservation of property then is the
primary object of the social compact...,,43
Little doubt, if any, is left by the above as to the fact that "human
rights and fundamental freedoms," as used in Article 55 include the
right to own property. Should any such doubt exist, however, it is well
established that it is appropriate to look to the purpose and meaning of
the instrument as a whole and to inquire into the intention of the parties
as indicated both at the time of, and subsequent to, the adoption of the
44
instrument.
The intent of the signatories of the United Nations Charter on this
point was made abundantly clear by their subsequent adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides:
"Article 17. 1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as
well as in association with others.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."
Subsequent events, however, have cast some doubt on this point.
The Covenant on Human Rights, which is presently under consideration
by the United Nations, does not contain Article 17 of the Universal
Declaration. While the Covenant has never been finally ratified by the
General Assembly, it nevertheless renders the intent of the signatories in
this regard less clear.
That the conclusion reached above is nevertheless correct seems
clear in the light of the circumstances preceding and surrounding the
drafting and adoption of the United Nations Charter. As it is clearly
stated in its Preamble, the Charter was adopted in the wake of a world
42

United States v. D'Auterive et al, 51 U.S. 609, 623 (1850).

43 Van Homer v. Dorrance, 2 Dal]. 304, 310 (U.S. 1795).
44 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,

heimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933).

223 (1943) ; Factor v. Lauben-

278
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war of a terrifying impact and proportions. One of the avowed purposes of the Charter was the prevention of the recurrence of such
apocalyptic conflicts. Recent history indicates that one of the early
symptoms of tyranny and aggression was the deprivation of minority
groups of property rights. It is therefore hardly conceivable that the
drafters and signatories of the Charter, their recent tragic experience
only too clearly in mind, did not intend to prevent such actions.
FINTAN M. FLANAGAN
GEORGE G. LORINCZI
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